


ORAL HISTORY OF THE  
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
INTERVIEWS WITH  
PAUL EVANS

BY CHARLES W. CRAWFORD  
TRANSCRIBER - BETTY WILLIAMS  
ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE  
MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY



26122641 DHT 7/1/92



**MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY  
LIBRARIES**

MVC  
TC  
425  
T2  
E923x  
1979


UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS LIBRARIES



3 2109 00699 6483







Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2012 with funding from  
LYRASIS Members and Sloan Foundation

<http://archive.org/details/oralhistoryofte00evan>

ORAL HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

INTERVIEW WITH PAUL L. EVANS

AUGUST 7, 1979

BY CHARLES W. CRAWFORD

TRANSCRIBED - BETTY WILLIAMS

ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE

MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
LIBRARY  
540 EAST 57TH STREET  
CHICAGO, ILL. 60637

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
LIBRARY  
540 EAST 57TH STREET  
CHICAGO, ILL. 60637

THIS IS THE ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE OF MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY. THE PROJECT IS "AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY." THE DATE IS AUGUST 7, 1979 AND THE PLACE IS NORRIS, TENNESSEE. THE INTERVIEW IS WITH MR. PAUL L. EVANS. THE INTERVIEW IS BY DR. CHARLES W. CRAWFORD, DIRECTOR OF THE MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE. TRANSCRIBED BY BETTY WILLIAMS. INTERVIEW # I.

DR. CRAWFORD: Mr. Evans, let's start with a little biographical background about you and then we will get on with some specific matters about TVA.

MR. EVANS: Okay. Well, I came to TVA in 1951. For the year prior to that I had been at the Ohio Wesleyan University in Delaware, Ohio, as professor of journalism. Prior to that I had been editor of the Daily Republic in Mitchell, South Dakota. I was editor there in '46-'47 when I was given a year's leave of absence to become a Neiman Fellow at Harvard. I had started my newspaper work in Mitchell after graduating from Dakota Wesleyan University at Mitchell, South Dakota.

I am a native of South Dakota and in addition to my work on the Daily Republic at Mitchell for about a year and a half I was editor, publisher of a weekly paper in Redfield, South Dakota.

Between newspaper assignments, I worked a year earlier for the Department of Agriculture as a information specialist in South Dakota, Iowa, and Indiana. I think that is about a capsule of the background.

DR. CRAWFORD: What year were you born?

The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research. It also mentions the scope of the study and the limitations. The second part of the paper discusses the methodology used in the study. It includes the data collection methods and the analysis techniques. The third part of the paper discusses the results of the study. It includes the findings and the conclusions. The fourth part of the paper discusses the implications of the study. It includes the practical implications and the theoretical implications. The fifth part of the paper discusses the future research. It includes the suggestions for further studies.

The study was conducted in a systematic and rigorous manner. The data was collected from a large sample of participants. The analysis was conducted using advanced statistical techniques. The results of the study are presented in a clear and concise manner. The findings of the study are discussed in detail. The implications of the study are discussed in detail. The future research is discussed in detail. The study is a valuable contribution to the field of research. It provides new insights into the topic. It also provides practical suggestions for further studies. The study is a model of good research practice. It is well-organized and easy to read. It is a valuable resource for researchers and students alike.

MR. EVANS: Nineteen fourteen.

DR. CRAWFORD: In South Dakota?

MR. EVANS: In Alpeda, South Dakota.

DR. CRAWFORD: Did you study journalism at Dakota Wesleyan?

MR. EVANS: No, I took one course in journalism. I edited the student newspaper. I was involved in a student uprising which got rid of a president.

MR. EVANS: My interest in journalism was from my activities as editor of the student newspaper. Because of my interest in editing and the student newspaper, I got involved in a student uprising which was designed to get rid of the president of the college which we succeeded in doing. But a half dozen of us almost got kicked out of school. We did try to get our degrees, but interestingly--this is not unrelated to TVA, because this was in the thirties and TVA then was in the Missouri Basin and a very big thing.

The people in the Missouri Basin were watching what was happening in the Tennessee Valley with considerable interest and the people of my age were interested in this experiment or this effort in Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley and followed it closely. I was very much interested in TVA at that time, with no thought of ever participating in any way. I followed this as the an editor of a newspaper in Mitchell and did have some small part editorially in the battle that resulted in the development of the Missouri River but not to a Valley Authority. Although that is what I thought [it would become] and similar to TVA--as it was developed like a shotgun wedding between the Corps of Engineers



and the Bureau of Reclamation.

Quite different from TVA, I think that a lot of the potential in the Missouri Basin went down the drain when they failed to make it. I learned later from Gordon Clapp that you can't pick up a pattern from the Tennessee Valley and transpose it on another river. But you can certainly adapt what the experience is in the Tennessee Valley to other rivers.

I think this is interesting to me and always has been that the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority has been used more outside of the United States than within the United States.

DR. CRAWFORD: I believe that we had a steady stream of visitors when you were at the TVA. People wanted to study it. How did you happen to get to TVA in 1951?

MR. EVANS: I had at one time worked for the Department of Agriculture for about a year. It was not a particularly satisfying experience. I had gone back in the newspaper work and then had gone for one year to teach at Ohio Wesleyan, thinking that would be a temporary thing and then I'd go back into newspaper work. While I was there a friend of mine who was an editor at Dayton, Ohio, called me one day and said, "Hey, TVA is looking for a Director of Information and their search committee came to me and I decided I wasn't interested in it." This man's name was Phil Locke. His father had done a great deal of writing about TVA. His father had been editor of Locke's Paper in Dayton. I'd know Phil as Neiman Fellow at Harvard. Phil called and said they were looking for someone and he had given them my name. It was late winter in Delaware, Ohio, and I said,



"Gee, Phil, I've worked for the government once and I don't want to work for the government again. But if they are interested enough to give me a free trip to the Tennessee Valley, I've already been there once, and I'd like to go back again and take a look at it."

So I was contacted by TVA. They paid my expenses down for an interview and I came down here with absolutely no intention of going to work for TVA. I was interested in what was going on in the Tennessee Valley. After a day talking to TVA people, I wanted the job. So I went home wondering if they would offer it to me. And they did offer me the job.

I came to work in June of 1951 for TVA as Assistant Director of Information. The man who was then Director of Information was the first director of information and his name was Bill Sturdivant. Bill's health was such that after the first day that I was in the office he never showed up again. So I immediately became active as Director of Information and then in a six months period actually became Director. It takes a little while to move things. I had a difficult time because I had nobody telling me what I had to do or how things should be done. But it was a challenging and fascinating experience because I could improvise, and I did. This was one of the most challenging and interesting experiences--the next ten or fifteen years--that I have ever had.

DR. CRAWFORD: Were you able to have much contact with Mr. Sturdivant? I know he was ill at the time.

MR. EVANS: No. Mr. Sturdivant's health was such and in fact he died, I think, within six months of when I came



to TVA. He was in the process of formal retirement at the time he died. He had not formally retired and then he died quite suddenly. I don't think anyone, including Gordon Clapp who was Chairman of the Board at the time and a very close personal friend of Bill's, knew how ill Bill was at the time. He just faded fast. I wish I had had more opportunity in the early days of TVA working with Dave Lilienthal and Gordon Clapp that Bill Sturdivant occupied a very important role in creating something that I was the beneficiary of and that was the tremendously good public reaction to TVA in the Tennessee Valley.

DR. CRAWFORD: I gather you have helped compile 40 years of TVA history development?

MR. EVANS: Yes, when I came to TVA, I think, one of the early things we did was to observe the twentieth anniversary. That would have been in 1953 and I came in '51. Yes, I was there at the last part of the second decade. This coming anniversary--then I went on in that tradition for the next twenty plus years. There was a time when, from the standpoint of time of service on the principal staff of TVA, I was a newcomer. Before I left, I was the old timer. I didn't feel that old, but I would look around, and say that none of these guys were here when I started this staff.

DR. CRAWFORD: Did you have any long-term staff members when you were joined TVA?

MR. EVANS: Yes, I did although Bill had been so sick that the staff had gotten into a holding operation. It was pretty much routine holding operation, but I would name three or

The first part of the book is devoted to a general survey of the history of the English language, from its origin in the Germanic invasions to the present day. The author discusses the influence of Latin, French, and other languages on the development of English, and traces the changes in its grammar and vocabulary. The second part of the book is a detailed study of the English language in the Middle Ages, from the time of Chaucer to the end of the fifteenth century. It examines the changes in the language during this period, and the influence of the various dialects on the standard language. The third part of the book is a study of the English language in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, from the time of Shakespeare to the end of the seventeenth century. It discusses the changes in the language during this period, and the influence of the various dialects on the standard language. The fourth part of the book is a study of the English language in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from the time of Johnson to the end of the nineteenth century. It discusses the changes in the language during this period, and the influence of the various dialects on the standard language. The fifth part of the book is a study of the English language in the twentieth century, from the time of the First World War to the present day. It discusses the changes in the language during this period, and the influence of the various dialects on the standard language.

The book is written in a clear and concise style, and is suitable for students of English literature and language. It is a valuable reference work, and is highly recommended for all those who are interested in the history of the English language. The book is divided into five parts, each of which is devoted to a different period in the history of the English language. The first part is a general survey of the history of the English language, from its origin in the Germanic invasions to the present day. The second part is a detailed study of the English language in the Middle Ages, from the time of Chaucer to the end of the fifteenth century. The third part is a study of the English language in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, from the time of Shakespeare to the end of the seventeenth century. The fourth part is a study of the English language in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from the time of Johnson to the end of the nineteenth century. The fifth part is a study of the English language in the twentieth century, from the time of the First World War to the present day. The book is written in a clear and concise style, and is suitable for students of English literature and language. It is a valuable reference work, and is highly recommended for all those who are interested in the history of the English language.

four people on that staff who were invaluable in regenerating an aggressive program of public information and public relations. Although we did not use the words public relations, of course.

They would be Reid Allen who was Bill's secretary and office manager and a very efficient person. And Bernard Foy, who was the librarian and the library being in the public information office for administrative purposes. Ken Kennedy, who was the principal writer and another guy who had perhaps limited ability in innovative areas, but was a gold mine of knowing what had happened and what the normal procedures were. This was Morris Hemmer. These people were on my staff [and] were invaluable to me in the first five years which were the hardest work that I ever did in my life. I enjoyed every minute of it, but we were operating with General Manager, Board members, division heads who had spent their lives at TVA. I was in my thirties. I knew only about TVA what I had been told or what I had read.

Every time I came up against these people not that there was an antagonistic basis, but if something was to be proposed, some move taken or a policy established, a letter written I had to deal with these people who knew the history. The only way that I could do it was to prepare myself, do my homework so that I would hopefully know as much about what the past history of a given subject was they did.

DR. CRAWFORD: I think you did a lot of reading and research work in the files studying the background, didn't you?

MR. EVANS: An awful lot of digging, reading everything I could about it. But probably the most valuable part that



I found, was the file of letters. Letters were signed by the TVA Board members, particularly the Chairman, because those letters, I think, even more than speeches, reflected the policies of TVA and they would answer questions. They were researched very carefully.

The Chairman might sign them, but not write any of it. Although it was traditional that the Chairman would send those letters back to the division or the office which prepared them if they didn't express the program or policy that he was aiming at. I have always said that if you really want to follow the development of policy in TVA, it is there in the letters. That was one of the places where I got most of my information.

DR. CRAWFORD: What three directors were there when you came?

MR. EVANS: Well, when I was hired, the directors were Gordon Clapp, Harry Curtis and Jim Pope. Jim Pope's term expired between the time I was hired and the time that I arrived. So when I arrived, there were only two directors--Harry Curtis and Gordon Clapp. Gordon Clapp was the dominant figure in TVA without question at that time. Harry Curtis was a very capable, salty and intelligent person. And his interests were essentially in the chemical engineering field.

DR. CRAWFORD: Well, that probably would be normal for someone who was coming from a specific background within the industry.

MR. EVANS: Harry Curtis was probably one of the most scholarly people, if not the most scholarly person, to ever serve on the TVA Board. He was a true scholar. He had been a professor of chemical engineering at Yale, had established the



school of chemical engineering. I believe he established the Yale School of Chemical Engineering. He was later Dean at the School of Engineering at the University of Missouri. He was a very distinguished person and a very candid salty individual. I admired him and respected him and really loved him.

Gordon Clapp on the other hand, was the kind of a person whose intellect you admired, but who never had the warmth. Although I admired him tremendously, he was a cool calculating administrator. He believed firmly in the administrative procedure. He was dedicated and dedicated to TVA. I remember Gordon Clapp saying when we would go on a trip some place, "Let's work out a schedule. We'll save this part of the evening for discussion." Somebody would say, "What will we talk about to these people?"

And Gordon would say, "TVA, what else! What else is there to talk about." He was not a warm individual. He had the respect and admiration of people and in his talks around the Valley to people in the Valley, I think that he succeeded because they respected his intellect, not because they were warmed by him. He was no silver-tongued orator. He was a very plain low-key talker. I loved to watch Gordon Clapp. He had a fair sense of public relations, but if there was a question between what might be good public relations and what might be good public administration, then he chose the public administration.

DR. CRAWFORD: He was firmly committed to proper procedures, wasn't he?

MR. EVANS: Absolutely! He was a bear for public procedures.



His best friend, and I saw this happen in reduction in forces, if the man that he lived next to in Norris, was being reduced from the force of losing a job, Gordon would no more think of saying "Boo" about that. That was the way things went and that was the way things were. He would never intervene personally in the operation of somebody like Program Division Director who he had given the responsibility to.

DR. CRAWFORD: I believe he was sort of a scholar of management and administration, wasn't he?

MR. EVANS: Yes, he was. I would describe him as belonging to the University of Chicago School of Management. He was a very strong believer in managing practices and policies. He not only believed it, but he practiced it.

I remember Gordon Clapp once said and this was shortly after I came there. President Truman was to appoint the third member of the Board to take the place of Jim Pope, the vacancy that had come about when Jim Pope's term expired. Truman announced that he was appointing a man and I can't even remember his first name--Waring--who had been a public administration man in the Philippines, I believe or something like that.

There was a long huddle between Gordon Clapp and Harry Curtis as I recall, after this announcement came from the press. The press was asking for comment. Gordon finally called and said, "Come in and we'll give you the comment for the press." So I went in prepared to get his statement to be issued to the press. Gordon said, "No comment." This was pretty rough for a presidential appointee. When somebody had appointed a colleague



on the Board for him and he said, "No comment." and stuck with it. That was the comment.

Waring's nomination was subsequently withdrawn and I always thought that Gordon Clapp had a good deal to do with the President's decision to finally withdraw it. They found something else for Mr. Waring to do, but there were enough jolly congressmen who respected Gordon's judgment to say to the President to take it away. "We aren't going to approve it." I don't think they would have approved it, but it was resolved by the nomination being withdrawn. Then Raymond Patey was named to the Board. Gordon's action in this situation was typical.

Interestingly, it didn't affect adversely his relationships with Harry Truman. He was very circumspect. Gordon was probably one of the few people who were administrators in TVA who practiced the arms-length political situation.

He tried to set the example for all of his staff and all of TVA that you do not bargain with politicians. But when Harry Truman was--Gordon told me this story himself--when Harry Truman was leaving office, Gordon went to stand in line to shake the President's hand. He was a principal appointee of the President. Gordon went to stand in line and he told me that when [the President came to him] he said, "Mr. Clapp, how are things at TVA?"

He said, "Thanks to you, Mr. President, just fine."

Harry Truman says, "No, Mr. Clapp, thanks to you."

DR. CRAWFORD: Did you feel that President Truman really kept up with progress in TVA?



MR. EVANS: I don't think any president since Franklin Roosevelt really kept up with what was going on in TVA. I think the closest that ever came in the time that I was there was when Dwight Eisenhower had to keep up with TVA because it became a burning sore point for him. I think that one of the things that caused problems for TVA was as time went on it became an established part of the federal bureaucracy. It operated reasonably well. The President didn't feel that he had to spend any particular time on it as Franklin Roosevelt did. It was his baby. So it became more and more difficult for TVA and its congressional delegations from the Valley to get executive attention. Other things crowded it out. The President became busier and busier.

I probably think Truman kept as close touch as anybody over a period of time following Roosevelt, but I don't think there was any real close attention as there had been in the Roosevelt days. I am guessing about the Roosevelt days or going on the record, I should say, rather than knowing from personal knowledge. All the evidence is that Franklin Roosevelt devoted a lot of personal attention to TVA matters.

DR. CRAWFORD: That would be understandable. My conclusions about your area of responsibility would be that you had to work very closely with the top management of TVA including the directors and the general manager for you had to translate this into releases for the public. Would that be essentially correct?

MR. EVANS: Yes, the Director of Information job in TVA as (I can't say that I have made it that way although I



have worked towards that end) was a swing job between the General Manager and the Board members. With secondary consideration given to the problems of the division directors. Primarily the Director of Information was one of the channels between the General Manager and the Board members. At that time, and I guess it is still the case, that the General Manager's staff included the Director of Information. But unlike other members of the staff, the Director of Information also had and utilized and developed in my case, direct contact with members of the Board.

Now, you were the employee of the General Manager, you were working directly with Board members and therefore, it was essential for good working relations that you be selective but factual in keeping the General Manager informed about what was going on between you and the Board members. In other words, you didn't conspire with the Board members on anything. The Board members operated with you on the basis of understanding that when they were talking with you about something then the General Manager did or would know about it. You had a constant advisory capacity and you were involved as Director of Information in any significant meeting.

If it was a meeting of the fertilizer program, you were there. If it was a meeting on navigation, you were there. If it was a meeting on power, you were there. So that like the General Manager, you participated at least, as an observer and more often than not, as a participant in those decisions in all fields.

DR. CRAWFORD: For you had to interpret this to the public.

MR. EVANS: That's right and you had to know the basis on which



the decision was made and the rationalization on which it was made and why this decision was reached so all the discussions were completely open to you. In fact, my relations with the General Manager were such traditionally and I served under how many of them--four or five--my relations with the General Manager were such that if there was a meeting going on and I had not automatically been included in the listing to attend the meeting, all I had to do was call the General Manager's office and say that I wanted to attend that meeting. I never once was turned down. They understood that you could not handle the agency's public information program unless you knew what went into decisions and what the thinking was behind the decisions.

This is the kind of cooperation I got traditionally from Board members and General Managers. It is the only thing that made the job possible.

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes, it seems to me both necessary and logical.

Did any other person in the TVA organization have similar contact and consultation? Did the Director of the legal department, for example, or anyone else?

MR. EVANS: The closest thing that would come, but didn't quite encompass the same broad area would be the General Counsel. The General Counsel had a comparable open door arrangement, but more often than not, let's face it, everything that is done has public information/public relations connotations. Not everything has legal connotations although most do. So, beyond that, there was not. Now, TVA during those days operated in the manner where before any major decision was made, even



though it might appear to encompass the navigation program, it would be opened up at a Board meeting which anybody could comment on it. So recognizing the inner relationships of the various programs so that nothing was done unilaterally between the Board and one division. It was always opened up so that if anybody had any input they had a chance to make it.

I think that the working with the Board members, the two areas that were the most sensitive were writing the letters that they signed and writing the speeches or drafts of speeches that they gave. Almost without exception TVA Board members did not write their own speeches in the initial draft. But equally without exception, they participated in the final draft so that it did reflect what they wanted to say.

DR. CRAWFORD: I am sure they would before they would use it. Did you have a conference, for example, with a Board member about the subject and then write a rough draft and then have another conference?

MR. EVANS: Well, it didn't get that formal most of the time. It was more likely to be a very informal.

(The tape was turned, but did not record. )

. . . .Gordon was one of Red's ideals. Red had much of the same austere respect and dedication to the absolutes. He admired Gordon greatly as a public administrator and knew that he was not and did not have the background in public administration. So, I think, it is fair to say that he modeled himself after Gordon Clapp--attempted to model himself after him.

DR. CRAWFORD: I am assuming that Clapp was influenced to some de-



gree by an early director himself.

MR. EVANS: Yes, but I've never been sure. It is something that has always intrigued me how much did Clapp influence Lilienthal and how much did Lilienthal influence Clapp. Now Clapp is the kind of a man if a question of principle came up, he would differ with Lilienthal. Later, when he was working for Lilienthal on the Development Resources Corporation and we got into--its too long a story to tell--but we got into a snafu with the Louisville Courier Journal. The Louisville Courier Journal quoted Dave Lilienthal to some effect that was derogatory or negative comment on something TVA was going then doing. Dave said something about, "Well, they misunderstood what he was saying." I wasn't there and I got this second hand.

Gordon Clapp said, "Dave, either you set that matter straight or I am going to." I do know that the letter that went to the publisher of the Louisville Courier Journal signed by Dave Lilienthal left no question about what the straight of the matter was. In fact, I was accused later of having pulled the rug out from underneath the reporter on the Courier Journal because the letter disowned the quote attributed to Dave. But the facts were that what Dave actually said I don't know. I am equally satisfied though that it was done and it was a harsh thing to do. But it was done and Dave did it because Gordon Clapp insisted that he do it.

Now, this was when they were both out of TVA, both head of the Development Resources Corporation and Gordon Clapp working. That again was the kind of person Gordon Clapp was and Dave would



flare and he would have been more inclined to have lived this thing out and said, "It's really not important." But these kind of things were important to Gordon.

DR. CRAWFORD: He overlooked no details.

MR. EVANS: He overlooked no details at all. He was a man of great detail and right down to the point of being persnickety and being accurate and factual.

DR. CRAWFORD: Your position as Director of Information put you in the center of communications of the agency, did it not?

MR. EVANS: Yes, it was both internally and externally. Now, it was at that time, I guess it was after World War II and the number of employees and number of projects was not as great as it had been. There were relatively fewer employees. Employment had gone up to 35,000 and back down to 18,000 and 20,000. The number of ongoing programs were lesser.

DR. CRAWFORD: This was after the big construction projects.

MR. EVANS: After the World War II construction peak had passed. Yes, the information office was the hub of the communications. It wasn't a very sophisticated system.

DR. CRAWFORD: A lot depended on not so much structure as personal contact between you and the people involved.

MR. EVANS: That's right. It was possible and I don't know how possible it is anymore. I know that I am old-fashioned on the business of public relations. We didn't use computers and didn't use public information surveys. We ran by the seat of our pants. We knew generally where our strengths and



weaknesses were. We knew which programs were accepted and successful and we knew which ones were in trouble. We knew where people would support us were.

Basically, if I could summarize my operation in the field of public relations, it would be that if you make the information available to people and give them the same facts that the Board had when they made the decision, the great majority of them will come up with the same answer. This is what we tried to do.

Now, this was before the day when every meeting was a goldfish bowl. I am not a newspaperman by training or tradition or heart, I still am not satisfied that you can operate a three-man Board without having the Board to have the chance to sit down and talk things out in private. Now, when they make a decision, they should be completely open and candid about that decision. They should explain why and answer any questions. But I think it is reasonable to me that the Board to kick things around ahead of time. Prior to that decision to exchange views and to do it in an easy relaxed atmosphere so that it doesn't become an adversary situation.

DR. CRAWFORD: That was generally done at least, between members of the Board, occasionally wasn't it because of their personal closeness?

MR. EVANS: Yes, now you see by the federal sunshine law that --well I guess they are prohibited from doing it-- but I like to compare it if you had a one-man administrator. This one man has to make a decision. Now, if he is conscientious, he is going to spend an awful lot of time going over the various



aspects of that decision. He doesn't have to think out loud. Why should three members of the Board have to think out loud. I can make the other point, but that happens to be the side of the argument that I believe in.

DR. CRAWFORD: Well, they also were doing this before such an age of public participation and any meetings that involved many objections from segments of the public represented there. Times, I am sure, were different to some degree.

MR. EVANS: Times were considerably different and I think that there was a quite different climate of opinion. TVA was a very popular organization. It had the confidence of the people generally in the Valley in the region. The people were confident that it was competent in its field. When TVA made a decision it would make an honest decision. They might not like it and might argue about the decision. They might disagree with it, but they didn't assume and start with the assumption that this was a venal or a loaded decision. They knew that the Board and treated the Board and treated the TVA decisions as being done in honesty even though they would disagree with them. Well, this changed in later years. So that TVA decisions were questioned probably with the big change coming, I think, started just a few years before I retired.

DR. CRAWFORD: In the seventies?

MR. EVANS: Yes, it came with the new environmental movement. And was strengthened by TVA's actions and decisions on strip mining which in hindsight I'd say were too little too late. So that we lost friends--lost groups as friends of TVA--who



would never be friends of TVA. Then there was another factor. The new environmentalists--and I am not taking off at them--I think they are conscientious and sincere and were a different generation than the generation that was running TVA.

DR. CRAWFORD: Their style was different.

MR. EVANS: Their style was different and their whole approach was different. But the effort to communicate between the two groups was extremely difficult. The new environmentalists had never known a major depression. They had never known bread lines and unemployment. They had never known kerosene lamps. They had never known wash-tub bath rooms and a path. They weren't raised that way and they said, "Hey, man, what is all this business about all this energy and why do we need all this energy?" As they used it, it was almost no meeting of minds and there were extremes in either case.

My feeling was that the some of the young environmentalists didn't--they weren't even sure that these dams should have been built. This was like heresy to a person like myself.

DR. CRAWFORD: It would have been heresy in the thirties.

MR. EVANS: But they didn't live through the thirties. So that there was such a narrow common ground to meet with and then there was TVA's preoccupation with power--electric energy as being the one element which encompassed everything and which touched on everybody's life--better living, better jobs, industrialization of the Valley, the better use of the Valley's resources. The decisions were made always if it was an option or a choice. We opted for the low cost of electric energy. I think



this was a fine decision to start with, but conditions changed. I think it prevailed too long as in the case of strip mining.

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes, quite possibly.

MR. EVANS: And I am using hindsight in this, let me say. I am not saying that I knew better at the time.

DR. CRAWFORD: I am not sure that anyone did at the time. I think the environmentalist position say in the early seventies had little concept of what had gone into correcting serious problems before. On the other hand, I suspect that many of the people in top management in TVA might have been advanced enough in age and status and set enough in style that they did not understand that these new people might have something.

MR. EVANS: No question about it. I think it is right. There was no dialogue. There was no real basis. We are for it and you are against it. There was no common ground in which they could get together and say, "Hey, what about this?" I think Tellico Dam is a controversy and is a fine case in point. I am and still am a strong advocate of completion of Tellico Dam and yet I can understand the questions that arose. There was no common basis that you could get together and we didn't get together and talk. TVA had responsibility and TVA said we are going to exercise that responsibility in this way. The Congress approved the funds for it and they went ahead with it.

If it is dead now and I guess it is, it is dead because of a quirk in the law. The fight was never about the snail darter. The fight was about Tellico Dam and whether it was a wise use of resources.



DR. CRAWFORD: The snail darter was discovered, at least the endangered status, considerably after the dam was underway.

MR. EVANS: After the dam and it was a device, a good slick and apparently legal device to stop the dam. I was not surprised when the Supreme Court decided that if the Congress meant what they said in the Endangered Species Act that . . . There was another factor that came along that I think is very significant in later years. You have got to remember that through all the first years--1933 to 1970 or '69--the TVA Board was able to make unilateral decisions about the resources in the Tennessee Valley. They did this within the framework of the TVA Act, but it was their interpretation of the Act and their decision as to what they should do.

Then, I believe the Act is entitled Environmental Protection Act of 1969. Nobody in TVA, I don't think at that time even the legal people, realized the import of this Act. Only later after court fights and everything else and still some of them going on was it realized that this really removed the TVA Board's ability to act unilaterally in making decisions and options on the use of resources. It took the decision out of their hands and put it in the hands of the Environmental Protection Agency. So that the Environmental Protection Agency could now overrule the TVA Board. The Act does that.

Here was an agency that operated for forty years, more or less with tremendous independence.

DR. CRAWFORD: With remarkable independence. They were enjoying



the advantages of federal government, but really situated aside from it in many aspects.

MR. EVANS: Now, somebody was going to say "grace" over their decisions in this area. That's what it is all about. This was a complete change. This was reflected, of course, in the suit that was brought on the steam plants in connection with the atmospheric pollution. It was reflected in again the snail darter case. No longer could TVA Board make unilateral decisions.

And it came at a time when there was one other factor that should be mentioned in that connection. That's the disenchantment and it doesn't seem to make too much difference to the power consumer in the Tennessee Valley that he is still getting electricity at below the national average. The fact remains that he is paying three times what he paid for at one time and he is unhappy about that. So he is disenchanted with TVA. He is not particularly impressed by the fact that he [has it] still cheaper than it is elsewhere in the country because he became accustomed to using electricity and paying a cent or less a kilowatt hour and now he is paying three cents a kilowatt hour. In that context one of TVA's strong public supports disappeared when this power rate increase took place. This was over a period of time, of course.

DR. CRAWFORD: Well, one generation passes and another takes its place.

MR. EVANS: That's right.

DR. CRAWFORD: The people who were aware of sharply increasing energy costs now generally are not the ones who



would not have to do without before TVA changes. I suspect they take it for granted.

MR. EVANS: I think that they take it for granted. I think the younger people particularly take it for granted. We come back to that same feeling that I have that they didn't go through the Depression, bread lines, unemployment, kerosene lamps and that kind living so they start from a different point. And they have a different point of view.

DR. CRAWFORD: Has TVA been slow in recognizing that a new point of view prevails out there in slowly adjusting to it?

MR. EVANS: I think that some fair case can be made that TVA as it grew older became more difficult for it to adjust to changes in circumstances. I suspect that this is the nature of people and people's organizations. I think that organizations age like people. I think TVA did become slow. I think that the time case of slow action and the one that sticks out in my memory because there was an internal debate within TVA for a number of years of the strip mining. I think nothing hurts TVA more than the failure to act swiftly and rightly on the question of strip mining and to do something effective about it. There are other cases, but I think generally an organization ages like a person does and when a person gets to a certain stage, you don't move as fast.

DR. CRAWFORD: Well, TVA I suspect had become comfortable with the decision about strip mining which considering the principles upon which it was based was the correct one at the



time probably. But it became hard to change, didn't it?

MR. EVANS: Yes, it became hard to change. We had numerous discussions about it. Red Wagner who was Chairman at the time that this was going on was troubled by it. He couldn't grasp a handle on what to do. He was so dedicated to the maintaining low cost energy that he didn't want to jeopardize that. He believed so strongly and I believe correctly that low cost energy was the mainspring of regional development. He knew that or underestimated--all of us at the time did with the dollars involved--it is hard now to really face to relate term cost to what we now pay because of the dollar value. But I feel that there was a slowness to act but not without some reason. TVA could act slowly on some things and I think they became a little more ponderous in its reaction. Maybe it is just one of the things that all of us have to remember. An agency gets set in its ways.

DR. CRAWFORD: I suspect that your bureaucratic arteriosclerosis is usual for an organization that has been around for awhile. People develop commitments to the organization itself perhaps more than the mission which they may have at the beginning when one is young.

MR. EVANS: That may be an explanation of it. I always been puzzled about this. I have the greatest respect for the capability and the abilities of the people I worked with in TVA. One of the things that I was always struck by was when the TVA staff got together with the Board to discuss a problem it was never a matter of personal involvement. It was always a



matter of what are the facts here. Who can marshall the facts and present them.

I've seen in that Board/Staff meeting discussions and arguments that went on with differences of opinion but never on a personal basis. It was always on the question of the issue.

DR. CRAWFORD: And the issue was what is the best policy.

MR. EVANS: What is the best thing to do. You take two people with differing points of view as to what the outcome should be or what the impact would be and they might disagree. But the disagreement would be on the issues and not a personal thing at all. The capability and skill of the people involved from that principal staff for years was an outstanding thing. I think there may have been a little carryover from the standpoint that TVA for years--this is not a theory that I developed, it's a theory that one of my friends in TVA developed and he used to make this case--that TVA became so accustomed to being the competent decision maker that when the Valley States became competent in an area they had a hard time getting their foot in the door because TVA still thought it was dealing with people in the Valley State Agencies who were not as competent as they were. They might be more competent at this point.

DR. CRAWFORD: In some cases their agencies were staffed by people who had had experience at TVA.

MR. EVANS: That's right. There's no question that TVA had, I think, a major impact on upgrading state agency staffs. Every field from recreation to agriculture in the states were more capable doing it. This was again one of Gordon Clapp's



theories that you worked through and with the local agencies and the state agencies. I think Gordon recognized that as much as anybody. Red Wagner was always very scrupulous about this of working with the state agencies and recognizing their interest.

Then, of course, there was always the distributors in the power field who were distributor organizations. There wasn't any bigger crime in TVA than to announce a power policy and have the distributor managers read about it in the newspaper. You didn't do this.

DR. CRAWFORD: They made another constituency.

MR. EVANS: They made another constituency with a special role.

They were partners in carrying out the power program. If you announced something that affected them, and they read about it in the newspapers, they were unhappy. Here again, you get into this question of the public's right to know or the point at which the public has a right to know. Do participants in a program have a right to know so that they can answer the public's question when the public is told? But the point in that was that there was a jealousy of the power distributor managers and they didn't want somebody telling their customers that this is what TVA and Nashville Electric Service or the Memphis Utility Board is going to do in the future. They wanted to be the ones that told them. And they had a very good case to bring against us.

So, one of the things we tried to avoid was catching that clientele off base. You went to great extremes to get the word to them directly if not before at the same time you told the



newspapers. So, they would know what TVA had decided.

I remember one classic case--gosh, it seems ridiculous now--but it was the Norris Centennial rate. The Centennial observation of Senator George Norris' birth. In honor of this TVA established a new rate, the lowest rate they had ever had. Certain distributors were going to be because of their sound financial position and their earnings being great enough and already selling power to anybody who would buy it at less than nine-tenths of cent a kilowatt hour were going to be able to do this. Some of them did adopt it incidentally.

But this announcement was made to the President in a Board meeting with President Kennedy. And the distributor managers read about it in the newspapers before the word got to them. There were a lot of unhappy distributors managers. They said, "You are telling us we are going to have a new lower rate and our customers are asking about it and we don't know a thing about it." They had a case!

DR. CRAWFORD: They did indeed!

MR. EVANS: Yes, they did. But this just illustrates the kind of pitfalls that you had to watch for with your various clienteles.

DR. CRAWFORD: I expect a lot of that was the price of success as TVA developed and extended its operations further affecting more people and more groups. And you had more groups that had to be consulted or at least informed about what was going on.

MR. EVANS: Well, the saying was true, for example, in the area



of agricultural policy where we worked closely with the state land grant colleges. You did not undercut the state land grant colleges Extension Service. In Forestry as the states forestry programs became a very strong influence in forestry, you didn't announce new forestry programs or directions without conferring with the State Forestry [Department].

DR. CRAWFORD: And you would consider the number of states affected.

MR. EVANS: Yes. This would get to be a real nightmare's nest of informing the right people. It isn't as if you had them all, each one on the end of a computer terminal. At that time you had to use telephone, pony express--pony express being the district power managers or district forestry managers or district agricultural managers--who would go out and see these people. They'd say, "Here, before it becomes public, we want you to know about this." Many times it was about things that they had participated in the planning and scheduling of. So, then we would have to coordinate the release program with them. It did become more complex as time went on in the area. For example, recreation--state park work--the designation of an area along a lake front which a state was going to take over and develop into a state park. TVA was very scrupulous. It would only announce that the Board might take an action one day, but it would never announce that it was making this available to the state of Kentucky or the state of Tennessee or the state of Alabama until the state of Alabama, Kentucky or Tennessee whichever state it was was ready to say, "Hey, public, here is what we are going to do on



this piece of land." So that you had this constant problem of their participation and yet you needed their support and participation.

DR. CRAWFORD: Well, communication from inside of TVA involved a lot of different groups--support groups, interest groups. As for the public, what sort of public estimation of TVA did you find when you joined the agency?

MR. EVANS: TVA was extremely popular in the region. I had been exposed to the reaction to TVA outside the region and TVA's popularity within the region with the public generally and with the public press generally was very good and very high. There would be points of difference and some exceptions, but by and large, TVA had the respect and almost affection of people. People would say, "No politician can run for office in the Tennessee Valley and be against TVA." That's no longer true, but I think at one time it was true. It was like being against motherhood.

DR. CRAWFORD: Where would you say and at what time would you say that the change began taking place?

MR. EVANS: I think it began taking place really at the time that the power rates started going up.

DR. CRAWFORD: Do you mean the increases in the mid-seventies?

MR. EVANS: That's right or early seventies.

DR. CRAWFORD: Of course, we are dealing with how people felt, but that really was to a large degree something in which TVA had no control, wasn't it?

MR. EVANS: That's right. Well, TVA had no alternate option.



The only alternate option that TVA had was to have started increasing rates earlier which I believe now they should have done. And to make the increases less of a bump when they came. But the classic case of proof of what I am saying is the fact that Clifford Allen, I believe the man's name was, (I think he has died since) was elected to Congress from Nashville. He was elected on an anti-TVA rate program. This was almost something unheard of. That was not alone--the rates were not alone. Strip mining had an effect here. With certain groups strip mining and with certain groups Tellico Dam had an effect. The whole matter of air quality. But basically, I think it couldn't have been successful (the campaign). I think Clifford Allen was a very shrewd politician when he figured out, "Hey, I can run for Congress against TVA and beat them to death by saying they are raising those rates too fast." Now, I think he was wrong from the standpoint of what TVA had to do. You see TVA had no option to raising those rates. But it wasn't a popular thing to do and he recognized it.

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes, and he was very popular. However, you knew yourself, didn't you, for some period of time before it happened that many of the energy resources in the country were being gathered together in a very large monopoly holdings. I am referring specifically to the petroleum companies who were buying up large quantities of coal reserves.

MR. EVANS: Coal reserves, yes.

DR. CRAWFORD: And TVA had to pay the going rate, I presume?

MR. EVANS: The going rate plus the costs have multiplied in



that field as we saw inflation, but also as a result of the consolidation. Interestingly, TVA's efforts to prevent a monopoly supply of coal go clear back to its early days in purchasing coal. One of the early controversies that I was involved in the early fifties when I came was that we were becoming an important coal buyer at the time.

TVA went out of its way to encourage the development of coal companies and mining companies so that nobody would have any given plant as a captive supplier. In doing this, TVA gave contracts for coal to a lot of small fly-by-night operators who really had nothing but a gleam in their eye and pick in their hand. With this contract they could mine coal. And of course, TVA didn't pay for the coal until it was delivered. We were severely criticized nationwide for not dealing with the solely established coal companies, but going out and really encouraging the development of suppliers in this field. It became a major controversy.

DR. CRAWFORD: In terms of stimulating the economy in the area and of keeping coal prices down for TVA, I suspect that was a very wise decision. It might have been environmentally damaging.

MR. EVANS: I'm not sure that you'd find it economically, because it wound up with us doing business with small dughole operators. And the question of whether they were an economic contribution came into question. We were criticized for that. I think it was a wise policy program to buy coal that way. It certainly resulted in the market being spread and not becoming



a captive of any one supplier. So it probably helped to hold prices down for a while. When the real crunch came, nothing could hold coal prices down.

I can remember in discussions on coal prices--we always dealt with it in the cost of BTUs. I can remember when twenty cents a million BTUs was a horrible price. Our power people would say, "Well the day may come when we are going to have to pay twenty cents per million BTUs. Now, TVA is paying a \$1.20 perhaps for a million BTUs for coal. [This was] five and six times as much as looked like the top price we would ever have to pay.

But all of these things resulted in a general unrest. I think one of the things that as TVA grew older, I think it became more identified as a federal agency. It suffered from, I don't have any question in the last few years I was there, we were feeling the effects of the general disaffection of the American public with government.

DR. CRAWFORD: What year did you retire?

MR. EVANS: Nineteen seventy-four.

DR. CRAWFORD: That was the watergate year, of course.

MR. EVANS: And that hurt. That hurt every public agency whether regardless of the fact that more people dis trusted and mistrusted the government and TVA was a part of the government.

The early days of TVA I am told that TVA enjoyed a distinction as people would cuss Washington and not include TVA.

DR. CRAWFORD: I believe that was absolutely correct. TVA, so far as I can understand in the administrative



structure, always maintained arms length from Washington, that is not keeping the agency headquarters there, or your telephone listing and so forth.

MR. EVANS: This is the kind of a thing that Gordon Clapp--you have to give Gordon Clapp credit for--this approach. He recognized the difference. Make this stand alone. In the long run we were caught in that general area. It was a factor along with all the other things we have talked about in the general disaffection and the lack of trust. You see, we went a whole cycle here. There was a time when if TVA said something that people would say, "Okay, we believe it."

In 1975 if TVA said something, "Hey, you can't believe a thing those fellows will tell you."

DR. CRAWFORD: It was rather like the church or the F.B.I. or even the presidency for a while enjoyed a great deal of trust as well as respect.

MR. EVANS: I don't believe that TVA destroyed this trust. The trust was there. I think that the times conspired to destroy the trust generally. That's what hurt. Where these other factors contributing--higher power rates, strip mining, and all these things--the very people who were criticizing us for strip mining were criticizing us for raising the power rates and didn't see the comparison.

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes, I think probably, the loss of trust in TVA's experience was not in any way at least a few ways the consequence of anything TVA did wrong. If there is any fault, it seems to me it might be in the area of leadership. That TVA



did not see these things developing and respond to them, but then perhaps, that is asking people to be prophets as well as administrators.

MR. EVANS: I've often wondered if a different set of administrative people would have seen the future clearer. I don't know. I agree that we didn't recognize the way of the environmental impact. Even when the Environmental Protection Act was passed, we didn't recognize it. I don't think anybody in TVA including--the lawyers might disagree with this--but their actions would speak otherwise. I don't think anybody recognized what real impact this would have on the Board's role and its freedom.

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes, I believe that it is unquestionably correct. However, I wonder with some of the early Board members if in dealing with it rather than a hostile relationship if they might not have ended up being the heroes of it. Surely, this agency was in a position to do something there.

MR. EVANS: Well, it is very possible. There were efforts made to say, "TVA can be the bell weather again." We can do this.

DR. CRAWFORD: Efforts made at the Board level?

MR. EVANS: Yes, with the effort made at the Board level. But I can't say that they were successful. Partially, this was the result of lack of attention what we talked about earlier from the executive branch. After all, TVA with the space program and the shot on the moon and so forth, you remember in '33 and the thirties, TVA was the space program. It was the moon



shot.

DR. CRAWFORD: And the Peace Corps.

MR. EVANS: Yes, and all of these things and whose program was it. What benefit is it to why John Kennedy came down and talked to TVA on the anniversary--I forget which one it was--down at Muscle Shoals? What was there for him in TVA as compared with a program he promoted and originated?

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes, by that time perhaps from the presidential viewpoint TVA had become another bureaucracy in government in which if left alone would run itself.

MR. EVANS: Without too much trouble.

DR. CRAWFORD: And leave them free for other things that would be an immediate priority and new and attractive.

MR. EVANS: I don't know what the difference is now. With all respect to the men who were appointed to the TVA Board during this period, I always felt that this lack of executive attention was reflected in that. It was no longer a case that the president said, "I'm going to find me the best man in the country." We got to the point where under Dwight Eisenhower, he nominated somebody because he understood erroneously that having two Republicans on the Board he had to appoint a Democrat. (Laughter) I think this was kind of the way it went. Some advisor would say, "Hey, we have a vacancy on the TVA Board."

"Well, give me somebody's name that will make people happy."

DR. CRAWFORD: Well, I am sure that presidents even in that period looked for the very best man to put in a position.



However, the position that they wanted to put best man in probably was a new program.

MR. EVANS: Yes, which would you do, if you had your choice. I don't fault the executive for what he did. If he had a new program that he wanted to fly and it was his program, he was going to pick the best man that he could get. If the name of the man that had that program were the name that would be on the TVA Board, you know where that man was going. So, I don't think you got the same consideration that you got from Franklin Roosevelt and perhaps following him, Harry Truman.

DR. CRAWFORD: I know our time is getting short for what we were going to do at this time. Do you have time for a few more questions?

MR. EVANS: Sure.

DR. CRAWFORD: Newcomers to top executive positions in an agency often have trouble having any influence, that is, directing policy. When there is an established bureauracy they have trouble getting any change or new concepts down through the bureauracy which often can be very resistant. Did you have the feeling that any of the TVA Directors encountered a problem with that?

MR. EVANS: Oh, I think they did and I think they felt the problem. I sympathized with them. Here again, we come to the hardening of the arteries bit that an organization becomes set in its ways. I think the prime example of this was when Herbert Vogel came on as Chairman. You have to remember that Herbert Vogel not only came from the Corps of Engineers but in



TVA's language that was strike one against him. He was the first Board member appointed by a Republican president. He came down to TVA with a lot of misconceptions.

Red Wagner was General Manager at the time. John Oliver had left TVA when Vogel came in. John figured that he shouldn't try to carry it on having been General Manager under Gordon Clapp and that there ought to be a new General Manager. Red was appointed to the post.

I remember in those days that Vogel came and the suspicion and the mistrust and distrust on both sides. It has always interested me in retrospect to realize in spite of the evasive relationships that went on for months there that both TVA and Vogel changed. It was like two emery wheels running against each other. Publicly, the guy who did more to make this change work than anybody else was Red Wagner as General Manager, possibly his major contribution to TVA.

First of all, I think, Vogel was impressed when he realized that TVA had a terrifically competent engineering organization and he recognized that. He was an engineer and he recognized competence.

The second thing, I think, and maybe it should be first, I don't know which. He recognized that he had as his General Manager a guy who would lay it on the line and tell him the truth whether it was good, bad or indifferent--whether it was what he wanted to hear or not. This is not, as I understand it necessarily the situation in military organizations. You would tell the C.O. what he wants to hear.



DR. CRAWFORD: Yes.

MR. EVANS: But this was not Red Wagner's operation. So Vogel discovered that he had an honest--scrupulously honest--General Manager. I think he could find out exactly what the situation was. It might not be what he expected to hear and might not be what he wanted to hear, but he respected the truth when he heard it. Over a period of time, it was interesting and it was one of the most fascinating periods in TVA, and also one of the most horrendous periods in TVA because of the tension which was terrific.

Vogel became convinced that, "Hey, here are a bunch of able, dedicated people, no matter what I was told or what I may have thought. They ain't a bunch of Socialists, Communists, pinkos--they're good citizens." He responded in time and made a contribution and made a very important contribution to TVA. Probably no Board member has ever left TVA and been more of a booster to TVA and defender of TVA than General H. D. Vogel since his retirement.

DR. CRAWFORD: He certainly has. He has written letters to newspapers and spoken to people about it.

MR. EVANS: Because he knows the integrity of TVA, that is why it is there. That integrity was exemplified in his early relationships by the one man--Red Wagner.

Now, other Board members had this problem. I saw them suffer with it. We had a program when Red was General Manager and later when Red was on the Board. We had a program for orientation for new Board members. It was very difficult, but I saw the Board members come and we would take them around the Valley and show



them TVA, have them talk to and with TVA people, with newspaper editors, and try to hold them still, let's face it, until they had a feeling for it. Don't make your speeches until you have a feel for this.

It was difficult for them because here they were in a position, and I sympathized because I had been in that position, dealing with people who had worked all their lives for TVA. Let me give you an example of this. A. R. Jones came to TVA from the Bureau of the Budget and when he was appointed there were many people in TVA who said, "Hey, anybody who comes to TVA from the Bureau of the Budget has got to be a first class S.O.B. and he can't be doing anything good."

DR. CRAWFORD: Almost like coming from the Corps of Engineers.

MR. EVANS: Worse if possible. A. R. Jones was a terrific man with figures--an accountant--and I mean accountant in the best sense of the word. So he could take a column of figures and he could take a balance sheet and he could figure out what it all meant. He could interpret it and say, "Hey, this is where this leads to." He was a modest sort of person. He was not a fighter. He believed that when the figures spoke this way that anybody ought to be able to see it and you didn't have to beat them over the head and argue with them about it.

He had a rough adjustment period. He became a good Board member, I think. He was conscientious, hard-working. But interestingly, he was the first administrator in TVA to say, "Hey, if you look at these figures on our power program, we are going to have to increase rates. We can no longer meet our



costs." He would draw out the graphs and show you where the two lines crossed, cost and revenue. [He would say,] "Look out here, unless something happens between here and there." Nobody would listen to him. He made his point and then he would retire. He wouldn't fight for it.

I think that the rate increase impact today--this is hindsight--would have been easier for TVA. We would never have gotten into the borderline of whether we were actually meeting costs or not if we had taken smaller bites earlier. But the one guy who saw it was A.R. Jones.

Now, let me say on the other hand, the power people--the power division people--who resisted this, up to this time, had always been able to come up with a few rabbits out of the hat like bigger units, lower unit costs, and they would always manage to hold those costs down. [They would keep] coal prices held down and so forth, but all those dogs jumped out from under the porch and started biting them at the same time. And Jones was right.

But you see he didn't carry through. He didn't fight it out even though he was a member of the Board.

DR. CRAWFORD: One more question then and I realize our time is getting short. On the Board of three people, I would assume that you generally have one person who may or may not have an official designated title and who tends to be the dominant member and is listened to most and his views are the most important in setting policy. Did you see this to be true?

MR. EVANS: Always during the time I was there, the Chairman of the Board was the dominant person. My reading



history is that it was always true except for the period when H.A. Morgan was Chairman for a year and Dave Lilienthal succeeded him as Chairman, but even at that time H.A. Morgan was not really the dominant figure as Dave Lilienthal. But during the time I was there, whether it was Gordon Clapp, H.D. Vogel or Red Wagner, the Chairman of the Board by temperament, by actual practice was the spokesman for, leader of and the dominant figure in TVA. There was never any question about it.

In one of the early moves to Muscle Shoals--I hope somewhere in your history you have encompassed TVA's move to Muscle Shoals--and the various abortive efforts to move TVA's headquarters to Muscle Shoals, but at one time (I don't know what was involved exactly except) Gordon Clapp in the early fifties (it had to be in the early fifties) had decided TVA was going to move its headquarters to Muscle Shoals. I don't know why. I never was able to figure out why. I guess I would have to say that he thought it was the best thing to do and so he was going to do it. The other members of the Board at that time were Harry Curtis, and Reverend Patey. The negotiations for moving to Muscle Shoals had gone on undercover for some months. The Information Office was prepared if somebody asked the question, we had the answer prepared, "Yes, we are considering and we are considering entering into a contract." But we were waiting for somebody to ask the question.

Finally, one day somebody from the Knoxville Chamber of Commerce called and said, "Hey, we hear a story that TVA is planning to build a new building and move to Muscle Shoals. Is



that true? "The answer was yes. Then it came out in the newspapers of course from that point. The pressure went on and the Congressmen and Senators got involved.

There was one informal Board session--very informal Board session--when the pressures were great. It was clear that Patey and Curtis had very little stomach for the move to Muscle Shoals. I can remember Gordon Clapp looking them square in the eyes and saying, "Look, gentlemen, you aren't going to pull the rug out from underneath me now." And they didn't. But the move was never made.

DR. CRAWFORD: But it was stopped at another level.

MR. EVANS: Yes, it was stopped at another level. That to me is an example of yes that the chairman of the Board was boss. A lot depended upon the Chairman to work with the other Board members in the times that I saw to recognize what their interests were, utilize their skills and abilities. But the Chairman had to carry the load. I think that there is just no question no matter what the Act says it has always been a strong chairman board.

DR. CRAWFORD: This is probably not easy to answer, but of all of them that you have observed, could you select any of the strong chairmen as being the most effective of all?

MR. EVANS: No, I don't think I could, Charles. I think that each one serving at at different time performed a different role so that to say that under given circumstances that another might have been stronger I don't feel that I could. For example, let's face it, I know that Red Wagner had in his latter



days of his Chairmanship an interestingly--you understand Red was a Board member longer than anybody else in the history of TVA. He served as Board member and as Chairman longer than anybody else. Red had difficulties, but as I look back unless they had foresight that I don't think they had, I think Herbert Vogel would have reacted pretty much like Red reacted. Now, he might have had a better flair for expressing it. Dave Lilienthal might have, but I think, again it is almost impossible to put another man into that position and say, "Here is the way he would have reacted."

It took me a long time to appreciate General Vogel. I finally got to the point where I liked him very much. I admire and like him. I learned a lot from him. I always felt much closer personally to Red Wagner than to any other chairman. Yet I expect in many cases, I had differences with Red as many or more than I had with anybody else. But I felt personally closer to him than--for example--nobody really ever felt close to Gordon Clapp. I admired Gordon Clapp. But you can respect a person's capability and not necessarily like him. Working with division heads I found frequently that I would have to admit, "This guy is a whizz in his field, but deliver me from him when it comes to personally knowing him." (Laughter)

No, I couldn't say, "No, there was one or any one." You see in all the time that I was there, we had only three Chairmen.

DR. CRAWFORD: TVA has been fortunate generally, I think, on its Board in having at least some strong people there all the time.

MR. EVANS: All the time, yes.



DR. CRAWFORD: I know their problems were different from one period to another. Is there anything else you would like to get on the record now?

MR. EVANS: I don't think there is anything. I think that TVA was a terrific organization--I can't speak for the present--with tremendous amount of competence, who dealt in facts. It earned the respect and the admiration of the people of the region by what it did and it got caught in its problems that flooded in on it. They were problems of the times more than they were problems of TVA. We can always deal with that business: Would a different set of management have recognized and been able to deal with those problems differently? I don't know. There isn't anything I can point to and say, "Hey, if I had been Chairman of the Board, (God forbid) this is what I would have done and it would have resolved that problem. Those problems weren't going to go away.

DR. CRAWFORD: Those were deep-seated and of wide extent, affecting TVA along with the country as a whole.

MR. EVANS: That's right. There was no easy answer. I think we are still dealing with them. I think the whole energy crunch--energy supply bit--is a problem. I think in the times we were dealing with that the dedication to low-cost electric power was a proper and wise decision. You can second guess it today and say we lead the people of the Valley down the road to use a lot of electric energy and then we raised the price on them. So we did dirt to them, but no, I think, too many people were affected favorably by improvement in their working conditions



were affected favorably by improvement in their working conditions  
improvement in employment, improvement in their living  
conditions. was all a mistake, I don't think it was a mistake.













